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1Abstract
This paper provides the ﬁrst in-depth analysis of the homeownership experience of
households in bankruptcy. We consider households who are homeowners at the time
of ﬁling. These households are typically seriously delinquent on their mortgages at the
time of ﬁling. We measure how often they end up losing their houses in foreclosure, the
time between bankruptcy ﬁling and foreclosure sale, and the foreclosure sale price. In
particular, we follow homeowners who ﬁled for chapter 13 bankruptcy between 2001 and
2002 in New Castle County, Delaware, through October 2007. We present three main
ﬁndings. First, close to 30 percent of the ﬁlers lost their houses in foreclosure despite
ﬁling for bankruptcy. The rate rose to over 40 percent for those who were 12 months
or more behind on their mortgage payment, about the same fraction as among those
who entered into foreclosure directly. Second, ﬁling for bankruptcy allowed those who
eventually lost their houses to foreclosure to remain in their houses for, on average, an
additional year. Third, although the average ﬁnal sale price exceeded borrowers’ own
estimates at the time of ﬁling, the majority of the lenders suﬀered losses. These ﬁndings
are pertinent to the recent debate over the bankruptcy code on mortgage modiﬁcation.
Finally, the paper also reports circumstances related to the loan, borrower, and lender
that make it more or less likely that a certain result will take place.
JEL Classiﬁcations: J22, K35, D14
Keywords: Homeownership, Chapter 13 Personal Bankruptcy, Foreclosure
21 Introduction
The residential mortgage delinquency rate and foreclosure rate have risen drastically over
the last two years as the nation’s housing market recession has deepened. Millions of people
have lost their homes through foreclosure or are on the brink of losing them. As a result,
personal bankruptcy has attracted increasing attention as a potential legal system of last
resort to cure delinquent mortgages. There is, however, substantial debate as to the extent of
the relief the current bankruptcy system is able to oﬀer to homeowners. Many people argue
that the current debt relief system is insuﬃcient because it does not allow for mortgage
loan modiﬁcation secured solely by the debtor’s principal residence. Indeed, several bills are
pending in Congress aiming to change precisely that.1
The legal profession, on the other hand, has long recognized that even in its current form,
personal bankruptcy overrides lenders’ contractual and legal rights to pursue foreclosure.
Filing for bankruptcy automatically stops foreclosure. Moreover, by discharging unsecured
debt, bankruptcy leaves borrowers with more available income for mortgage payments, which
decreases the risk that their homes will be encumbered by judgment liens. Chapter 13
bankruptcy even allows the ﬁler to cure a mortgage arrearage over a several year period
while continuing to make regular mortgage payments in accordance with the contract.
Prior to this analysis, it has been diﬃcult to talk sensibly about whether the current
system provides homeowners with “enough” protection because we simply did not know the
homeownership experience of bankrupt households. As Jacoby (2007) points out,
“No one has speciﬁcally tracked the outcomes for chapter 13 ﬁlers who ﬁle for
the purpose of saving their homes from foreclosure ...”
Economic scholars have not traditionally viewed personal bankruptcy, chapter 13 in par-
ticular, as a mortgage borrower protection mechanism. The existing literature has generally
examined the impact of bankruptcy exemption on mortgage lending (Berkowitz and Hynes
1999, Lin and White 2001, Pence 2006, and Chomsisengphet and Elul 2006). While some
researchers are aware of the role bankruptcy protection plays in borrowers’ default and fore-
closure decisions, they tend not to build bankruptcy explicitly into their analysis (Ambrose,
Buttimer, and Capone 1997, and Capozza and Thomson 2006). The few exceptions are
Bahchieva, Wachter, and Warren (2005), Long (2005), White and Zhu (2008), and Levitin
and Goodman (2008). Bahchieva, Wachter, and Warren (2005) document the mortgage in-
debtedness of bankruptcy ﬁlers. Long (2005) examines bankruptcy ﬁlings’ long-run negative
1Scarberry (2007) gives a summary and comparison of mortgage reform bills currently pending in
Congress. These bills, if passed, would expand bankruptcy tools with the goal of encouraging modiﬁca-
tion of subprime mortgages within the structure of the banking system.
3eﬀects on households’ access to credit. White and Zhu (2008) build a theoretical model to
explore households’ joint decision of bankruptcy and mortgage default. Levitin and Good-
man (2008) study interest rate variation by property type as the current bankruptcy code
only allows for mortgage strip-down on non-single-family owner-occupied properties.
Similarly, despite ample evidence on mortgage foreclosure outcomes (Ambrose, Buttimer,
and Capone 1997, Stark 1997, Lambrecht, Perraudin, and Satchell 2003, Grover, Smith, and
Todd 2006, Pennington-Cross 2006, and Gerardi, Shapiro, and Willen 2007), few studies
track bankruptcy outcomes, especially the outcomes of chapter 13 bankruptcy ﬁlings. Of
those that do, none follow up on homeownership experience during and after bankruptcy
(Norberg and Velkey 2007, and Eraslan, Li, and Sarte 2007).
In this paper, we build a unique dataset that allows us to track the homeownership
experience of homeowners who ﬁled for bankruptcy between August 2001 and August 2002
in New Castle County, Delaware. We construct three measures of homeownership experience
by asking the following questions: How often do people lose their houses to foreclosure
during and after bankruptcy? How much time elapses between a bankruptcy ﬁling and the
foreclosure sale? What is the foreclosure sale price in the event that the house does end up in
foreclosure? The ﬁrst measure gives us a sense of homeownership sustainability during and
after bankruptcy, while the second and third measures shed light on the potential gains and
losses to homeowners and lenders that result from foreclosure during and after bankruptcy.
We have three main ﬁndings. First, despite having ﬁled for bankruptcy, close to 30 percent
of the ﬁlers lost their houses to foreclosure sale by October 2007. The foreclosure sale rates
jumped to 39 percent and 41 percent, respectively, for ﬁlers who were over 6 or 12 months
delinquent on their mortgage payments at the time of ﬁling. Second, ﬁling for bankruptcy
allowed those who eventually lost their houses to remain there for 26 months, on average.
Third, average ﬁnal sale prices exceeded borrowers’ own estimates at the time of ﬁling, a
result due largely to the run-up in house prices in the early periods of our sample. Despite
this, most lenders did not collect enough money to cover the total mortgage outstanding as
well as mortgage arrearage and, thus, suﬀered losses up to 30 percent of the amount they
were owed.
Our ﬁrst result helps address the question: Does bankruptcy reduce foreclosures by giving
borrowers breathing space? For comparison, we follow houses that the New Castle County
Sheriﬀ’s Oﬃce listed as in foreclosure sale but whose owners did not ﬁle for bankruptcy
between August 1, 2001, and August 1, 2002. We ﬁnd that roughly 43 percent of the owners
had their houses foreclosed by October 2007. This rate, though higher than the foreclosure
rate of our overall sample, is not very diﬀerent from that observed among homeowners who
were 12 months or more delinquent on their mortgage payments at the time of bankruptcy
4ﬁling.
Our second result conﬁrms some earlier ﬁndings in the literature: loans that transition
from delinquency into bankruptcy simply take longer to reach their ultimate resolution —
foreclosure, in the case of mortgage loans (Capozza and Thompson 2006).2 Speciﬁcally,
bankruptcy adds, on average, one year to delinquent mortgage debtors’ stays in their house.3
Time to sale for a foreclosed property is negatively correlated with its eventual sale price.
Our third result has several interesting implications. First, contrary to many conven-
tional views, borrowers in our sample appear not to be overly optimistic about their houses’
values, having estimated their values at less than what ultimately materialized in the mar-
ket. Their houses often fetched a higher price in foreclosure than their estimated market
value at the time of bankruptcy ﬁling, even though many of the houses were sold at ﬁre sale
prices. Second, the majority of lenders suﬀered losses, despite relatively high sale prices and
even without taking the further accumulation of mortgage arrears into account. Together
with considerable administrative fees, trustee commissions, and legal expenses, these results
suggest signiﬁcant social losses. Speciﬁcally, after adjusting for inﬂation, we ﬁnd that the
a v e r a g el o s sf o rt h el e n d e ri s$ 1 3 , 9 0 3p e rh o m ea n dt h em e d i a nl o s si s$ 5 , 3 0 3 .A s s u m i n ga n
additional 20 percent foreclosure fee, the loss increases to $35,334 for the average house and
$23,215 for the median. Put it in relative terms, lenders lost on average 30 percent of the
amount that was owed to them.
Finally, our paper identiﬁes borrower, lender, and loan characteristics that aﬀect home-
ownership outcomes. To highlight some of the results, we ﬁnd that borrowers who are
seriously delinquent in their mortgages, highly leveraged, or have suﬀered spells of unem-
ployment are more likely to lose their houses during or after bankruptcy. By contrast, being
married and having an experienced attorney reduce the hazard rate of homeownership loss.
Interestingly but not surprisingly, the time between bankruptcy ﬁling and property foreclo-
sure sale is determined by the number of payments borrowers have missed on their mortgages,
attorney experience, and, to some extent, whether the mortgage is serviced by a servicer.
The relative sale price, by contrast, is largely determined by the neighborhood housing mar-
ket and economic situation as well as characteristics of the property itself. Whether the
mortgage loan is serviced by a loan servicer reduces the time between the end of bankruptcy
and foreclosure sale but does not aﬀect foreclosure sale price.
2Capozza and Thompson (2007), however, do not distinguish between chapters 7 and 13. By the nature
of the system, chapter 13 ﬁlers may still be in bankruptcy eight months after a 90-day delinquency. Thus,
the relevance of their continued presence in bankruptcy over an eight-month period is diﬃcult to interpret.
3Since most ﬁlers for bankruptcy were already seriously delinquent on their mortgages, without bank-
ruptcy ﬁling, it is reasonable to assume that they would be in foreclosure very soon. Indeed, at the time of
ﬁling, about 27 percent of households in our sample were already in foreclosure.
5Taken together, our results suggest that personal bankruptcy does appear to provide
homeowners with additional breathing room to try to cure their delinquent mortgages, but
it does not appear to protect homeownership in the long run or housing values for lenders.
What does this tell us about recent proposals to use the bankruptcy process to protect home-
ownership? One possibility is that existing mechanisms to avoid foreclosure in bankruptcy
need to be strengthened, as proponents of recent legislation argue. The alternative is that
households entering bankruptcy were likely to lose their houses under any circumstances,
including expanded opportunities to modify contracts in court. Our evidence provides no
support for the ﬁrst possibility and lends some credibility to the second possibility. Further
research is necessary to resolve these issues. To conclude, this paper, to the best of our knowl-
edge, represents the ﬁrst in-depth analysis of the homeownership experience of households
in bankruptcy, a necessary ﬁrst step toward evaluating policy options.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss details regarding foreclosure and
bankruptcy laws in Section 2. We describe bankrupt households’ characteristics in Section 3.
We report on these households’ homeownership experience in section 4 and the determinants
of their homeownership outcomes in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional Background
2.1 Foreclosure Laws
When a borrower defaults on a home mortgage, the lender may attempt to recover its
losses by repossessing and selling the property. This act is governed by state property laws
regarding the judicial foreclosure process, statutory rights of redemption, and deﬁciency
judgments.
There are two widely used types of foreclosure. Foreclosure by judicial sale is available
in every state, and it is the required method in many, including Delaware. Within this
framework, the mortgaged property is sold under the supervision of a court, with the proceeds
going ﬁrst to satisfy the mortgage, then to satisfy other lien holders, and ﬁnally to the
borrower. The second type of foreclosure is foreclosure by power of sale. Here, the mortgage
holder is permitted to sell the property without court supervision. Where it is available,
foreclosure by power of sale is generally faster than foreclosure by judicial sale.
After the foreclosure sale is complete, the homeowner can still regain the property if his
state grants a statutory right of redemption. Up to a year after the sale, depending on the
state, homeowners can redeem their property for the foreclosure sale price plus foreclosure
expenses. In Delaware, there is no right to redeem after the conﬁrmation of the sheriﬀ’s sale
6except for tax foreclosure. If the sale proceeds do not pay oﬀ the existing mortgage on the
property plus costs, most states, including Delaware, allow the lender to collect a deﬁciency
judgment equal to the lender’s foreclosure losses against the borrower’s other assets.
2.2 Homeowner Protection under Bankruptcy Law
The current personal bankruptcy law contains two chapters: chapter 7 and chapter 13. Filing
for bankruptcy under either chapter imposes an automatic stay on all collection eﬀorts by
lenders, which includes foreclosure that is already in progress. The stay can only be lifted
by the court during bankruptcy or after the bankruptcy case is terminated.
Chapter 7, the more frequently utilized option, discharges ﬁlers’ unsecured debt but
requires them to surrender any assets that exceed state exemptions. For homeowners that
have built up home equity, there is a risk that the trustee may sell the home and distribute
any equity that exceeds the state homestead exemption to creditors. Chapter 7 personal
bankruptcy, nevertheless, has implications for mortgage protection. For example, discharging
debt under chapter 7 aﬀords borrowers who have not defaulted on their mortgages or who
have reached work-out agreements with their lenders more available income to make their
mortgage payments, thus protecting their homes from judgment liens.
Unlike chapter 7, chapter 13 permits a defaulting mortgage borrower to propose a plan
to cure a mortgage arrearage over time while continuing to make regular mortgage payments
outside the plan. If the court conﬁrms the plan, the automatic stay will protect the borrower
until the plan is completed, the plan fails and the case is dismissed, or the plan is converted
to chapter 7. In the latter two cases, lenders will often petition to have the automatic stay
removed. A chapter 13 repayment plan typically lasts for 3 to 5 years. Even homeowners with
substantial equity can save their homes by making more payments to unsecured creditors
instead of subjecting their houses to sale as under chapter 7. Therefore, chapter 13 overrides
lenders’ contractual and legal rights to pursue foreclosure. For the remainder of the paper,
we concentrate on chapter 13, as it provides the stronger form of mortgagor protection.4
3 Bankrupt Households’ Characteristics
3.1 Data
Our data come from four diﬀerent sources. The main dataset contains information on all of
the chapter 13 personal bankruptcies that were ﬁled between August 1, 2001, and August 1,
4For further discussion of the treatment of homeowners in bankruptcy prior to 2005, see White (1998),
Berkowitz and Hynes (1999), Lin and White (2001), and Bahchieva, Wachter, and Warren (2005).
72002, in New Castle County, Delaware. We collected these data using an electronic service
that grants public access to case and docket information from federal bankruptcy courts and
the U.S. Party/Case Index, commonly known as Public Access to Court Electronic Records
(PACER). This service oﬀers bankruptcy court information including: i) a listing of all
parties and participants, including judges, attorneys, and trustees, ii) a chronology of all
events entered in the case record, iii) a claims registry, and iv) the types of documents ﬁled
for speciﬁc cases and imaged copies of these documents.
T h ed o c k e ts h e e ta n dc o u r tﬁles allow us to extract important dates that mark the
chapter 13 bankruptcy procedure, including the ﬁling date, the conﬁrmation date, and the
dismissal or discharge date as well as ﬁlers’ ﬁnancial and income information at the time of
ﬁling and the ﬁnal outcome of the case. The court ﬁles include debtor petitions, attorney
disclosure forms, statements of ﬁnancial aﬀairs, chapter 13 plans, and trustee reports. Each
debtor’s petition contains schedules labeled A through J that set forth his or her ﬁnancial
situation, including real property ownership; other personal assets in the form of furniture,
cash, or insurance; liabilities such as secured debt and unsecured priority debt (taxes); and
maintenance expenses.5
Using property addresses and owners’ names, we linked this bankruptcy dataset with a
foreclosure sale database provided by the Sheriﬀ’s Oﬃce in New Castle County, Delaware.
The sheriﬀ’s sale dataset lists the sale date, plaintiﬀ, defendant, attorney for the plaintiﬀ,
mailing address, and outcome of each foreclosure ﬁling from July 2001 to October 2007. We
added foreclosure sale price, as well as the price and date of the last sale before foreclosure,
to this database using information provided by The Reinvestment Fund of Delaware (TRF).
Knowing the last sale date before foreclosure allows us to calculate owners’ tenure in their
houses. We obtained the sale histories for properties that did not end up in foreclosure sale
and for which TRF does not have price information from the New Castle County Recorder
of Deeds.
Finally, we obtained local economic and housing market information by merging 2000
census survey results with our data, using property zip code as the key. This information
includes homeownership rate, average household size, labor force participation rate, percent-
age of people below the poverty line, median family income, median house value, and median
monthly housing costs for mortgaged properties.
5The court ﬁles are mostly “pdf” images from which information cannot be directly extracted using
software. We manually collected all of our data by downloading these images and coding them into a
database. The data were entered twice and the corresponding entries were cross-checked. The data were
also checked against diﬀerent sources where the same information was reported. For instance, the summary
of schedules provides headline numbers on ﬁlers’ assets, debts, income, and expenditures, while petition
schedules A through J provide the same information in greater detail.
83.2 Proﬁles of Bankrupt Households
Between August 1, 2001, and August 1, 2002, there were 756 chapter 13 bankruptcy ﬁlings
in New Castle County, Delaware, about 70 percent of all of the chapter 13 bankruptcies
ﬁled in Delaware during that period. Of the 756 ﬁlers, 611 owned homes at the time of
ﬁling. We exclude ﬁlers who owned multiple properties from our sample since many of these
ﬁlers appear to be speculators. We also delete observations with incomplete information
on ﬁlers’ basic income and balance sheets due to ﬁler reporting or court recording errors,
as well as observations with missing housing price information from TRF and the Recorder
of Deeds. The ﬁnal sample has 567 observations. Of the 567 ﬁlers, 291 ﬁnished repayment
plans successfully and obtained discharge,6 11 converted to chapter 7 and obtained discharge
there, and the rest were dismissed under chapter 13.
A tt h et i m eo fﬁling, bankruptcy ﬁlers in our sample have owned their houses for an
average of 7.5 years. The median house tenure is ﬁve years, and about 7.5 percent of the ﬁlers
have owned their houses for less than one year (Figure 1.a). Twenty-seven percent of ﬁlers are
already in the foreclosure process. We proxy the number of months of mortgage delinquency
by dividing the total mortgage arrears (including interest) by the reported monthly mortgage
expenses, which often include tax payment. According to our calculation, over 80 percent of
the borrowers in our sample are delinquent on their mortgages at the time of ﬁling, with an
average length of delinquency of 10 months (Figure 1.b).7 Moreover, mortgage borrowing
at the point of ﬁling approaches or exceeds the value of most bankrupt homeowners’ homes.
The average mortgage loan-to-value ratio (LTV) is 0.97,8 and more than half of the ﬁlers have
mortgage debt equal to or in excess of the estimated value of their home at the time of ﬁling,
suggesting that most homeowners did not go into bankruptcy to protect their home equity
but rather to “hold on to their houses.” (Figure 1.c).9 Even for those who have lived in their
current houses for over 10 years, the average mortgage LTV is 0.94, contrary to expectations.
6The plan completion rate among our ﬁnal sample, at 51 percent, is much higher than the 44 percent
discharge rate for the whole sample. See Eraslan, Li, and Sarte (2007).
7Porter (2007) ﬁnds that mortgage companies often impose unreasonable fees and charges on mortgage
claims without borrowers’ knowledge. Thus, our calculation of months of mortgage default based on bank-
ruptcy ﬁles may overstate the true length of mortgage delinquency.
8The 0.97 average LTV among our bankruptcy homeowners is substantially higher than the 0.78 and 0.91
mean LTV at ﬁling among bankruptcy homeowners in 1991 and 2001 as reported by Surveys of Bankruptcy
Petitioners.
9As Bahchieva, Wachter, and Warren (2005) ﬁnd, using interview data of 400 bankrupt homeowners
in 2001, homeowners in ﬁnancial trouble are extremely reluctant to give up their homes even when it is
ﬁnancially rational to do so; many homeowners in bnakruptcy describe themselves as trying to save their
homes even when their own description of the value and the mortgage amounts would suggest they should
abandon it.
9And the average mortgage LTV dropped only to 0.90 for homeowners with house tenure of
over 15 years. These data imply that high mortgage LTVs among bankrupt homeowners
are not entirely attributable to high LTVs at the onset or brief tenure since exotic mortgage
contracts such as interest only and reverse mortgages are more of a recent phenomenon.
These homeowners must have reﬁnanced and increased the outstanding principal on their
mortgages before they ﬁled for bankruptcy.
The majority of the ﬁlers’ debt is in mortgages, 71 percent for the mean ﬁler and 74
percent for the median, comparable to the national average reported by the 2001 Survey of
Consumer Finances. Their monthly mortgage payments average about 33 percent of their
reported monthly income net of insurance and payroll deductions (Figure 1.d), far exceeding
the 11 percent national average for homeowners reported by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve (see http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/housedebt/).10 Interestingly,
however, mortgage arrears account for only about one-third of total debt in default, with the
latter calculated as the sum of mortgage arrears and unsecured priority and nonpriority debt.
To identify subprime loans, we employ a commonly used methodology, using a 2001 U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) listing that classiﬁes lenders as gen-
erally making either prime or subprime loans (see: www.huduser.org/datasets/manu.html).11
According to this classiﬁcation, subprime lenders originate or service about 15 percent of our
mortgage loans. We further distinguish lenders as local or nonlocal by deﬁning local lenders
as those with headquarters in Delaware, Pennsylvania, or Washington, D.C. According to
our classiﬁcation, about 8.1 percent of the lenders are local. In addition, we are able to single
out borrowers who make their payments to mortgage servicers based on the name of their
mortgage lenders; i.e., we classify a lender as a servicer if its name contains words such as
“service” or “servicer.” Roughly 4.2 percent of the borrowers in our sample make payments
to loan servicers.
Table 1 summarizes this information. This table also reports information related to bor-
rowers’ demographics, income, assets, and liabilities. Compared to other Delaware residents,
borrowers in our sample are less likely to be married, with 43 percent of the sample being
recorded as married, versus 54 percent of the state of Delaware overall. Approximately 16
percent of the ﬁlers list alimony as part of either their monthly income or monthly expenses,
suggesting a recent divorce. About 4 percent have experienced a recent unemployment spell,
10The two ratios are not exactly comparable, since the mortgage payment number in our data often
contains property taxes and the income number is after payroll and insurance deductions. But it is highly
unlikely that these deﬁnition diﬀerences will make up for the over 20 percent diﬀerence in mortgage debt
service ratio between our bankruptcy sample and the national average.
11The methodology, though imperfect, is widely used by, among others, the Federal Reserve and Harvard
University’s Joint Center for Housing Studies.
10slightly less than the 5 percent state unemployment rate.12 In addition, one-fourth of the
ﬁlers have prior bankruptcy experience.
As expected, the level of these borrowers’ indebtedness is striking. Speciﬁcally, their
total debt has a median of $137,848, around nine times the national median indebtedness of
homeowners, while their median total ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial assets are $114,901, about
84 percent of the corresponding national median. Their median unsecured debt is $16,814,
compared to a national median of $0 for homeowners. We estimate a lower bound for
medical debts by ﬂagging keywords such as “health,” “medical,” and “Labcorp” that are
listed either as the debt type or the associated creditor. This lower bound estimate comes
to $1141 for the average ﬁler and $2915 for the average ﬁler who reported positive medical
debt. More than one third of the borrowers report positive medical debts.
Furthermore, we deﬁne attorney experience based on in-sample frequency for both bor-
rowers in bankruptcy and lenders pursuing foreclosure. In particular, if an attorney par-
ticipates in 25 or more of the cases in the sample, then we classify the attorney as being
experienced. A borrower who ﬁles bankruptcy by himself, i.e., pro se, is equivalent to hav-
ing an inexperienced attorney. All lenders are represented by attorneys in foreclosure. As
can be seen in Table 1, foreclosure cases are mostly handled by the same group of lawyers.
Additionally, about 3 percent of foreclosure cases list the county government as the plaintiﬀ.
In New Castle County, local governments can foreclose in the event of nonpayment of taxes,
sewer and water costs, and other fees such as vacancy fees and mitigation costs. Redemption
rights are denied to foreclosed homeowners except for tax lien foreclosures.
Filers in our sample live in areas spanning 27 ﬁve-digit zip codes. We take the ratio of the
ﬁler’s estimated home value and the local median home value. Similarly, we calculate ﬁlers’
income relative to the regional median. Finally, we calculate, for each zip code, the ratio
of median housing costs to median home value. All these measures are meant to capture
local house buying and mortgage lending conditions, which determine how long it takes to
auction a house and for how much it will sell.
There are substantial economic diﬀerences across regions. For example, average house-
hold annual income is $17,679 in the poorest neighborhood and $105,971 in the richest
neighborhood. Similarly, the adult labor force participation rate varies between 41.8 per-
cent and 77.6 percent, and the proportion of families living below the poverty line ranges
from 0.9 percent to 24.1 percent. Homeownership rates vary between 32 percent and 96
percent. Median home values also vary substantially, from $71,100 to $415,200. Median
housing costs for mortgaged properties range from $858 a month to $2,385 a month. Median
12This observation is consistent with chapter 13 requirement that ﬁlers need to have a regular job for a
meaningful repayment plan.
11household size also varies between 1.66 and 3.01.
4 The Homeownership Experience of Bankrupt House-
holds
We construct three quantitative measures to capture the homeownership experience of bank-
ruptcy ﬁlers. These are:
House tenure: For the purpose of this study, we deﬁne house tenure as whether borrowers
lost their current houses to foreclosure during the period of our observation. Few
households sold their houses voluntarily within chapter 13 plans. We thus treat these
debtors the same as those who remained homeowners through the end of our sample
period. Note that our house tenure deﬁnition refers to parting with ownership of a
particular property. This need not be construed as a permanent return to the rental
sector.
Time to foreclosure: For those whose homes ended up being sold in foreclosure, we measure
t h et i m et of o r e c l o s u r eb yc a l c u l a t i n gt h eg a pb e t w e e nt h ef o r e c l o s u r es a l ed a t ea n d
the bankruptcy ﬁling date.
Foreclosure sale price: We use the sheriﬀ’s sale price as the foreclosure sale price if the
house was sold to a third party. If the sale was a lender buy-back, we use the price
at which the lender subsequently sold the house to a third party. In a few cases, we
observe a symbolic $10 sale price when the lender sold its repossessed house to another
institution. We exclude these cases from our analysis of sale prices.
Table 2 presents summary statistics of these three measures. Close to 30 percent of
debtors lost their houses to foreclosure despite ﬁling for bankruptcy. The foreclosure sale
rate rose to 39 percent for those who had been delinquent on their mortgages for six months
or more at the time of ﬁling, and to 41 percent for those who had been delinquent on
their mortgages for 12 months or more. Although not directly comparable, we examine
homeowners whose houses were listed as in foreclosure sale between August 1, 2001, and
August 1, 2002, and who did not ﬁle for bankruptcy. We ﬁnd that 43 percent of this group
lost their houses to foreclosure by October 2007. The comparison, though far from ideal,
suggests that bankruptcy does not help homeowners keep their houses.
The majority of the auction sales were lender buy backs (i.e., the sheriﬀ’s auction didn’t
generate a third-party sale) though most of the lender buy back properties were sold to
12third parties within one year. Interestingly but not surprisingly, 11 percent of those who
completed their chapter 13 payment plans successfully and hence had their debt discharged
still lost their houses to foreclosure by October 2007, while 45 percent of those who failed
to carry out their chapter 13 repayment plans successfully and hence were dismissed in the
bankruptcy court lost their houses to foreclosure sale (not on the table). We did not ﬁnd
strong evidence that homeowners were merely using chapter 13 as a way to catch up with
their mortgage payments with no intention or ability to carry out the chapter 13 repayment
plan to its full length. About 17 percent of those who were dismissed but did not lose their
houses to foreclosure sales were voluntary dismissal.
The time-to-sale measurement of bankruptcy ﬁlers’ homeownership experience captures
the tension between borrowers and lenders in foreclosure sale. When the ultimate outcome is
foreclosure sale, the longer a homeowner stays in his house without making proper payments,
t h em o r eb e n e ﬁts the homeowner enjoys, and the greater cost the lender bears. In our
sample, the average time between bankruptcy ﬁling and foreclosure sale is about 28 months.
On balance, the longer a ﬁler has been delinquent at the time of bankruptcy ﬁling, the shorter
the time to foreclosure. However, even for ﬁlers who were already one year delinquent on
their mortgage payments at the time of ﬁling and who, without ﬁling for bankruptcy, would
most likely be in foreclosure already, the average foreclosure sale did not occur for 26 months.
Alternatively, if we focus on those households that were already in foreclosure at the time
of bankruptcy ﬁling, the average foreclosure sale also did not occur for 26 months. This is
10 months longer than the average foreclosure sale recorded by the sheriﬀ’s oﬃce between
2001 and 2007. Furthermore, to isolate the worst of the non-ﬁlers to see if they look more
like ﬁling homeowners, we study the foreclosure length at the 75 percentile for our non-ﬁler
homeowners. The length is 20 months, still half a year shorter than the foreclosure length
of our bankruptcy sample. This ﬁnding is consistent with Capozza and Thomson (2006),
who tracked a sample of seriously delinquent subprime mortgages for eight months starting
in 2001 and found that loans that transition from delinquency into bankruptcy ultimately
resolve in foreclosure and eventual disposition of the real estate collateral (REO), but the
time to get there can be quite extended. The average time between the termination of a
bankruptcy case and the foreclosure sale is about 11 months (not on the table).
Foreclosed houses in our sample fetched, on average, $97,241 in 2001 dollars, less than
the average $121,149 for which other foreclosed houses were sold between 2001 and 2007
in New Castle County. Third-party sales generated higher median prices but lower average
prices than lender buy backs. Longer time-to-sale is also associated with lower sale price;
the correlation coeﬃcient of the gap between bankruptcy ﬁling and foreclosure sale and the
ﬁnal foreclosure sale price adjusted for inﬂation (to third parties) and house price growth is
13−0.16.
Finally, in nominal terms, the foreclosure sale price generally exceeded the estimates
that owners made when they ﬁled for bankruptcy due to the overall run-up in house prices
during that period. This result remains true even in real terms and contradicts the belief
that mortgage borrowers have tended to be overly optimistic about their property values
over the last 10 years. After we adjust for house price growth using the OFHEO house
p r i c ei n d e xf o rD e l a w a r e ,t h er e a ls a l ep r i c ef a l l st oa b o u t90 percent of what homeowners
estimated when they ﬁled for bankruptcy. If we take into account mortgage outstanding and
mortgage arrearage accumulated at the time of the ﬁling, the sale price averaged about 88
percent of the total amount outstanding, and over 70 percent of the lenders did not recover
their losses. The ratio increases if we consider the 20 percent housing transaction fee.13,14
Put diﬀerently, if we assume that the mortgage outstanding at ﬁling did not accumulate any
additional interest or penalty, and if we adjust for inﬂation, we ﬁnd that the average loss to
the lender is $13,903 per household and the median loss is $5,303. Assuming a 20 percent
transaction cost, the loss increases to $35,334 for the average household and $23,215 for the
median. The losses would be even greater if we took the time cost of money into account.
Figure 2 panels a, b, c, and d chart the distribution of the time between foreclosure sale
and bankruptcy ﬁling and between foreclosure sale and bankruptcy termination, as well as
the ratio of sale price to estimated property value at the time of bankruptcy ﬁling and the
ratio adjusted for inﬂation.
5 Determinants of Homeownership Outcome
5.1 Methodology
In this section, we analyze circumstances related to the loan, borrower, and lender that
aﬀect the probability that a certain homeownership result will occur. To that end, we
employ Heckman’s two-step estimation technique to adjust for selection bias, since we only
observe time to foreclosure and foreclosure sale price for properties that were sold through
foreclosure.
13Grover, Smith, and Todd (2006) also ﬁnd in their 2002 sample of mortgage foreclosures in Hennepin
and Ramsey counties in Minnesota that the strong and appreciating housing market in the early 2000s had
a positive eﬀect on the sheriﬀ’s foreclosure sale price. Contrary to our ﬁndings on bankruptcy sample,
however, they ﬁnd that most foreclosured properties were sold for more than the outstanding amount due
on the mortgage for the foreclosure sample.
14Stark (1997) found that the costs amounted to 19.1 percent of the ﬁnal judgment amount — the amount
mortgage borrowers owed to lenders — in 1993 foreclosure sales cases and 18.43 percent of the ﬁnal judgment
in the 1994 sale cases.
14In the ﬁrst step, we conduct a Probit estimation of the selection equation that determines
whether the bankruptcy ﬁler lost his house in foreclosure by the end of our sample period.
In the second step, we augment the regression equation with the nonselection hazard and
obtain the parameter estimate. A consistent estimate of the regression disturbance variance
is obtained using the residuals from the augmented regression and the parameter estimate
on the nonselection hazard. See Heckman (1979) for more details.
5.2 Estimation Results
5.2.1 Foreclosure Outcome
The ﬁrst-stage estimation is a Probit estimation of foreclosure outcome, where we estimate
the probability that a ﬁler’s house will be foreclosed on during our sample period. Our
explanatory variables include information on debtors’ housing situations at ﬁling as charac-
terized by months of mortgage delinquency, mortgage LTV, house tenure, whether the ﬁler
was already in foreclosure at the time of bankruptcy ﬁling, and if so, whether the foreclosure
was initiated by government (foreclosure due to delinquent taxes); mortgage lender informa-
tion, such as whether HUD characterizes the mortgage lender as a subprime lender, whether
the lender is local (i.e., headquartered in Delaware, Pennsylvania, or Washington, D.C.),
whether the mortgage is serviced by a servicer, and lender attorney experience; household
characteristics, such as previous bankruptcy experience, attorney experience, job tenure,
marital status, number of dependents, and adverse events the ﬁler may have experienced,
such as a recent divorce or unemployment spell; and income and ﬁnancial information, sum-
marized by monthly mortgage payment as a portion of monthly income, whether the ratio
of medical debt to total debt in default exceeds 10 percent, debt in default as a portion of
monthly income, and assets relative to total debt. We also include local economic infor-
mation such as the local homeownership rate, the adult labor force participation rate, the
percent of households living in poverty, ﬁlers’ income relative to local median income, ﬁlers’
house value relative to the local median house value, and local housing maintenance costs
(local median housing costs relative to the local house median house value for mortgaged
properties).
Table 3 shows the results of the estimation. As expected, the longer a mortgage has
been delinquent when the ﬁler declares bankruptcy, the more likely it is that the house
will be foreclosed despite the bankruptcy ﬁling. In fact, an additional month of mortgage
delinquency increases the probability of foreclosure by 1.20 percentage points. The LTV
also aﬀects the probability of foreclosure, with a one percentage point increase in LTV
leading to a 0.28 percentage point increase in the probability of foreclosure. If the ﬁler
15is already in foreclosure at the time of the bankruptcy ﬁling, the probability of a later
foreclosure signiﬁcantly increases if the current plaintiﬀ is the county government. None
of the other lender characteristics, however, have a notable eﬀect on the probability of
foreclosure. Among demographics, being married decreases the probability of foreclosure.
Adverse events, such as unemployment, increase the likelihood of foreclosure signiﬁcantly.
The probability of foreclosure decreases signiﬁcantly if either the ﬁl e ro rt h el e n d e rh a sa n
experienced attorney, as foreclosure is a costly outcome for both parties. Among ﬁnancial
and income variables, a higher monthly mortgage payment relative to income increases the
probability of foreclosure. None of the other income and ﬁnancial information, such as debt
in default relative to monthly income and assets relative to debt, aﬀects the probability of
foreclosure, though the variables’ coeﬃcients have the expected signs. None of the regional
economic variables matter, with the exception of housing costs: in areas with higher local
housing costs, it is more likely that the ﬁler will lose his house to foreclosure.
5.2.2 Time to Sale
Table 4 reports our second-stage estimation results concerning the time between foreclosure
sale and bankruptcy ﬁling. We present results with and without the Heckman selection bias
adjustment, and they look very similar. Explanatory variables in this stage include months
of mortgage delinquency at the time of bankruptcy ﬁling; the same lender information used
in the ﬁrst stage, such as whether the lender is a subprime mortgage lender, whether the
lender is headquartered in Delaware, Pennsylvania, or D.C., and whether the debtor makes
payments to a loan servicer; if the ﬁler is already in foreclosure, whether the foreclosure was
initiated by the local government; ﬁler attorney experience; lender attorney experience; and
local zip code-level economic information summarized by the local homeownership rate, the
labor force participation rate, the poverty rate, the average household size, local housing costs
as a percentage of median house value, ﬁlers’ income relative to the local median household
income, and ﬁlers’ estimated house values relative to the median local house value. The other
variables, such as ﬁlers’ income and ﬁnancial information, as well as demographics, aﬀect
the time to sale only through their impact on the probability of the house being foreclosed.15
Among all these variables, the ones that explain the time to sale at the 5 and 10 percent
statistical signiﬁcance levels are the number of payments the ﬁler has missed when he ﬁles
for bankruptcy, whether the foreclosure was initiated by the county government due to
delinquencies on taxes, and the experience of the ﬁler’s attorney. The longer the ﬁler has
failed to make his mortgage payments, the more ﬁnancial stress the ﬁler is likely to be in and
15Including these income and ﬁnance variables directly in the second stage does not aﬀect our estimation
results notably.
16thus the less time it takes for his house to be foreclosed. By contrast, tax lien foreclosures and
the involvement of experienced bankruptcy lawyers substantially lengthen the time between
the bankruptcy ﬁling and the foreclosure sale. Tax lien foreclosure in Delaware is the
only foreclosure that allows borrowers’ redemption right for up to a year. The presence of
redemption rights complicates the foreclosure process and discourages potential buyers from
purchasing the property. A longer chapter 13 payment plan can be beneﬁcial to ﬁlers as it
gives them more time to catch up with their delinquent mortgage payments.
As an alternative, we deﬁne time to sale as the time elapsed between bankruptcy termi-
nation and the foreclosure sale date and repeat the exercise above. The estimation results
are reported in Table 5. Interestingly, the amount of mortgage delinquency at the time
of bankruptcy ﬁling no longer explains the new time to sale gap. If the lender is a loan
servicer, on the other hand, the time between bankruptcy termination and foreclosure sale
is substantially shorter. With the exception of large banks, loan servicers often are not the
originating banks and they do not bear the direct cost of foreclosure. As a result, they have
less incentive to lengthen the foreclosure process in the hope of avoiding it. The experience
level of the ﬁler’s attorney no longer explains the time to sale, as expected, since the attor-
ney’s responsibility is mostly limited to bankruptcy proceedings. Finally, the value of the
house relative to the local median house value is an important determinant of the time to
sale from bankruptcy termination. The higher the value is, the less time it takes for the
house to be sold.
5.2.3 Sale Price
Tables 6 and 7 present the second-stage estimation results regarding sale price. In table
6, the dependent variable is the ratio of sale price to estimated house price at ﬁling, both
adjusted for inﬂation and for local price appreciation. In table 7, the dependent variable
is the ratio of sale price to mortgage debt plus mortgage arrearage at ﬁling, adjusted for
inﬂation and for local house price appreciation. In particular, we calculate the growth rate
of house prices during the time between the bankruptcy ﬁling and the house’s sale using
the Oﬃce of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) house price index for the state
of Delaware. We then divide the ratio of the real sale price to real market value of the
house at the time of ﬁling or total mortgage balance including arrearage by the growth rate.
Note that, for lender buy backs, we use the price at which the lender subsequently sold the
property to a third party. In the event that the sale price is booked at a symbolic $10 or
less, we exclude the observation from our estimation.
The explanatory variables in the second stage are exactly the same as those used to es-
timate time to sale. To reiterate, the variables include months of mortgage delinquency at
17t h et i m eo fb a n k r u p t c yﬁling; the same lender information that was used in the ﬁrst stage,
including whether the lender is a subprime mortgage lender, whether the lender is headquar-
tered in Delaware, Pennsylvania, or D.C., and whether the lender is a loan servicer; if the
ﬁler is already in foreclosure, whether the foreclosure was initiated by the local government;
ﬁler attorney experience; lender attorney experience; and local zip code-level economic in-
formation summarized by the local homeownership rate, the labor force participation rate,
the poverty rate, average household size, local housing costs as a percentage of median house
value, ﬁlers’ income relative to the local median household income, and ﬁlers’ estimated
house values relative to the median local house value.
The results appear similar in tables 6 and 7 and with and without the Heckman selection
bias adjustment. We start with the estimation results in table 6 with the Heckman selection
bias adjustment. Interestingly, the ﬁler’s own housing situation does not aﬀect the fore-
c l o s u r es a l ep r i c er e l a t i v et ot h ep r i c ea tﬁling. Among lender characteristics, local lenders
are able to fetch a higher relative price, likely due to their familiarity with local market
conditions. Lender attorney experience also plays an important role in generating a higher
foreclosure sale price. Local market conditions are the most important determining factors
by far. Speciﬁcally, a relatively poor neighborhood with a larger proportion of people living
in poverty is likely to generate a lower relative sale price. Foreclosure sales also cause houses
on the high end of the market, as measured by their value relative to the local median house
value, to suﬀer more in value. The local homeownership rate is positively correlated with
local average household income. Thus, a higher homeownership rate may lead to higher rela-
tive auction prices. On the other hand, however, keeping everything else the same, a higher
homeownership rate may also indicate a saturated local housing market and, thus, a lower
relative auction price. Our estimation indicates that the latter force dominates. Finally, the
local average family size may proxy for housing demand, as large families may desire more
strongly to own homes. Thus, a larger local average family size might lead to higher relative
foreclosure sale prices.
The results in table 7 concerning sale price relative to mortgage balance plus arrearage
due at the time of ﬁling are very similar to those in table 6 with the exception that the local
homeownership rate is no longer statistically signiﬁcant.
Before concluding, we explore the robustness of our estimation results. In particular,
we restrict our sample to ﬁlers who are already delinquent by 90 days or more in their
mortgage payments when they ﬁle for bankruptcy. In practice, a loan that is 90 or more
days delinquent is considered to be seriously in default. In doing this, we restrict our sample
to homeowners that are more likely to have ﬁled for bankruptcy to protect their houses.
We are left with 418 observations, over 70 percent of the original sample. We then repeat
18our regression analysis as above. The new estimation results are similar to our benchmark
exercise and we do not report here to save space.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper, we construct a unique dataset that tracks the homeownership experience of
chapter 13 bankruptcy ﬁlers for ﬁve to six years after their initial ﬁlings. Our results have
a “glass half full/half empty” quality. In particular, we ﬁnd that over 40 percent of the
ﬁl e r sw h oh a db e e no n ey e a ro rm o r ed e l i n q u e n to nt h e i rm o r t g a g e sa tt h et i m eo fﬁling lost
their houses to foreclosure, about the same as the portion among those who went into the
foreclosure process without ﬁling for bankruptcy. Conﬁrming the conventional belief, we ﬁnd
that ﬁling for bankruptcy adds a little over a year to a normal foreclosure process. Finally, we
ﬁnd that the foreclosure sale price, in nominal terms, exceeds ﬁlers’ own estimates at ﬁling,
which suggests that, at least in our sample, they did not appear to be overly optimistic about
the market value of their property. Nevertheless, over 70 percent of lenders still lost money
and the average loss amounts to almost 30 percent of what is owed to the mortgage lender.
Our results suggest that personal bankruptcy does appear to provide homeowners with
additional breathing room to try to cure their delinquent mortgages, but it does not appear
to protect homeownership in the long run or housing values for lenders. Our analysis lends
some credibility to the argument that households entering bankruptcy were highly likely to
lose houses under any circumstances, including expanded opportunities to modify contracts
in court. Thus, strengthening existing mechanisms to avoid foreclosure in bankruptcy, as
proponents of recent legislation argue, may have a modest eﬀect if the characteristics of
bankruptcy ﬁling homeowners under the new law are not very diﬀerent from the existing
ones.
Obviously, more detailed, national data and further analysis are needed in order to answer
the question of whether personal bankruptcy provides homeowners with real relief directly.
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth mentioning that, as Jacoby (2008)
h a sa r g u e d ,p e r h a p si ti sm o r e ,i fn o te q u a l l y ,i m p o r t a n tt oa l s of o c u so ne ﬀorts that encour-
age sustainable homeownership instead of promoting and prolonging homeownership in all
instances.
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21Table 1. Data Summary: The Proﬁles of Bankruptcy Filers
Variable Mean Median S.D.
Mortgages
House tenure (years) 7.52 5.07 7.34
Already in foreclosure process (%) 27.2 44.5
Months of mortgage delinquency 9.81 8.38 9.12
Mortgage LTV at the time of ﬁling (%) 97.2 98.6 32.5
Monthly mortgage payment ($) 915 805 488
Monthly mortgage payment/income (%) 33.4 30.7 18.4
Mortgage arrearage/debt in default (%) 34.7 29.7 29.5
Subprime mortgage lender (%) 14.8 35.6
Local lender (%) 8.1 27.3
Mortgage serviced by a servicer (%) 4.2 20.2
Tax lien foreclosure (%) 2.8 16.6
Lender attorney in-sample experience (%) 88.5 31.9
Demographics
Married (%) 43.0 49.6
Recently divorced (%) 16.4 37.1
Job tenure (years, current job) 5.2 1 8.1
Self-employed (%) 4.4 20.5
Experienced unemployment spell (%) 3.7 18.9
Borrower attorney in-sample experience (%) 85.7 35.0
Previous bankruptcy experience (%) 24.9 43.2
Income and ﬁnance
Household monthly income ($) 2,988 2,692 1,409
Total assets ($) 135,356 114,901 96,479
Total liabilities ($) 161,646 137,848 95,367
Total debt in default ($) 43,777 30,867 52,619
Total unsecured debt ($) 30,747 16,814 48,901
Medical debt/total debt in default>0.10 (%) 7.6 26.5 0
22Table 2. Data Summary: Homeownership Experience of Households in Bankruptcy
Variable Mean Median S.D.
House tenure: losing houses to foreclosure (%) 27.9 45.4
Lender buy back (%) 18.7 39.0
Third party sale (%) 9.2 28.9
Bankruptcy ﬁling to foreclosure sale (months) 27.7 24.8 13.4
Filers 3 months delinquent at ﬁling 28.2 24.7 14.1
Filers 6 months delinquent at ﬁling 27.3 24.7 13.5
Filers 1 year delinquent at ﬁling 26.4 24.8 12.4
Bankruptcy termination to foreclosure sale (months) 13.2 11.9 14.5
Filers 3 months delinquent at ﬁling 13.6 12.2 13.1
Filers 6 months delinquent at ﬁling 13.4 11.9 12.7
Filers 1 year delinquent at ﬁling 13.1 11.0 13.7
Foreclosure sale before the termination of bankruptcy (%) 14.1 34.8
Foreclosure sale price ($, 2001 price) 97,241 90,256 53,707
Lender buy back (subsequently sold to third party) 99,165 87,171 55,248
Third party sale 93,732 96,277 51,123
Sale price/estimated market value at ﬁling 1.14 1.09 0.51
Sale price/estimated market value at ﬁling (adj. for inf., growth) 0.91 0.89 0.40
Sale price/(mortgage+arrear) at ﬁling (adj. for inf.) 0.88 0.88 0.44
Sale price/(mortgage+arrear) at ﬁling 0.71 0.71 0.31
(adj. for inf., growth, trans. cost)
23Table 3. Estimation Result: The Foreclosure Outcome
Variable Estimate S.D. Marginal Eﬀect
Months of mortgage delinquency 0.039∗ 0.008 0.012
Mortgage loan to value ratio 0.906∗ 0.314 0.285
House tenure -0.015 0.010 -0.005
Already in foreclosure at ﬁling -0.076 0.145 -0.024
Tax lien foreclosure 0.675∗∗ 0.361 0.248
Subprime mortgage lender 0.120 0.180 0.039
Local lender -0.094 0.226 -0.029
Lender being loan servicer 0.206 0.293 0.069
Lender attorney experience -0.397∗ 0.189 -0.136
Previous bankruptcy experience -0.260 0.160 -0.079
Filer attorney experience -0.581∗ 0.170 -0.204
Job tenure -0.001 0.009 0.000
Married -0.299∗ 0.149 -0.092
Number of dependents 0.033 0.049 0.040
Recently divorced 0.125 0.168 0.040
Experienced unemployment spell 0.647∗ 0.322 0.236
Monthly mortgage payment/income 0.831∗ 0.379 0.261
Medical debt/total debt in default>10 percent 0.141 0.234 0.046
Debt in default/monthly income 0.004 0.003 0.001
Asset/total debt 0.163 0.307 0.051
Local homeownership rate (%) 0.009 0.017 0.003
Local labor force participation rate (%) -0.026 0.022 -0.008
Income/local median household income 0.016 0.268 0.005
Local households living below poverty line (%) -0.014 0.036 -0.005
Estimated house value/local median home value -0.108 0.170 -0.034
Local median housing cost/local median home value 311∗ 124 98
Local average household size 0.725 0.832 0.228
Number of observations: 567; Pseudo R-squared: 0.170.
Notes: 1.* indicates signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level.
2. ** indicates signiﬁcance at the 10 percent level.
3. For dummy variables, marginal eﬀects are calculated for discrete change from 0 to 1.
24Table 4. Estimation Result: Time to Sale
(ﬁling date to foreclosure sale date in months)
Variable With Adj Without Adj
Estimate S.D. Estimate S.D.
Months of mortgage delinquency -0.199∗∗ 0.110 -0.237∗ 0.110
Subprime mortgage lender 3.647 3.238 3.616 3.394
Local lender 3.514 4.208 3.925 4.353
Lender being loan servicer -4.776 4.821 -5.196 4.995
Tax lien foreclosure 10.372∗ 4.701 9.774∗ 4.796
Filer attorney experience 5.815∗ 3.010 6.661∗ 2.803
Lender attorney experience 0.296 2.941 0.858 2.912
Local homeownership rate (%) 0.043 0.299 0.032 0.312
Local labor force participation rate (%) -0.253 0.396 -0.221 0.411
Income/local median household income -0.681 3.582 0.113 3.479
Local households living below poverty line (%) -0.207 0.601 -0.196 0.629
Estimated house value/median home value -3.237 2.493 -3.224 2.614
Local median housing cost/median home value 3328 2088 2806 1981
Local average household size 14.727 15.162 13.767 15.807
Mills ratio 2.451 4.125
Observations: 567; Observations: 158;
χ-squared: 101.89. Adj. R-squared: 0.117.
Notes: 1.* indicates signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level.
2. ** indicates signiﬁcance at the 10 percent level.
25Table 5. Estimation Result: Time to Sale
(bankruptcy termination date to foreclosure sale date in months)
Variable With Adj Without Adj
Estimate S.D. Estimate S.D.
Months of mortgage delinquency -0.05 0.149 0.007 0.130
Subprime mortgage lender -1.072 3.793 -1.004 3.974
Local lender 5.107 4.920 4.570 5.094
Lender being loan servicer -11.992∗ 5.652 -11.387∗ 5.843
Tax lien foreclosure 8.920∗∗ 5.201 9.729∗∗ 5.609
Filer attorney experience 4.346 3.582 3.163 3.285
Lender attorney experience 1.585 3.459 0.795 3.408
Local homeownership rate (%) 0.090 0.352 0.100 0.369
Local labor force participation rate (%) 0.012 0.469 -0.037 0.486
Income/local median household income 0.627 4.168 -0.378 4.082
Local households living below poverty line (%) -0.149 0.710 -0.170 0.743
Estimated house value/median home value -4.759∗∗ 2.810 -4.997∗∗ 3.010
Local median housing cost/median home value 3911 2429 4585 2324
Local average household size 22.058 17.845 23.427 18.592
Mills ratio -3.318 4.826
Observations: 567; Observations: 158;
χ-squared: 90.41. Adj. R-squared: 0.068.
Notes: 1.* indicates signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level.
2. ** indicates signiﬁcance at the 10 percent level.
26Table 6. Estimation Result: Foreclosure Sale Price
(sale price/estimated property value at the time of bankruptcy, inf. and housing market adj.)
Variable With Adj Without Adj
Estimate S.D. Estimate S.D.
Months of mortgage delinquency -0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003
Subprime mortgage lender -0.080 0.096 -0.074 0.094
Local lender 0.323∗ 0.130 0.255∗ 0.127
Lender being loan servicer -0.067 0.151 -0.012 0.146
Tax lien foreclosure -0.137 0.157 -0.035 0.140
Filer attorney experience 0.135 0.094 0.009 0.079
Lender attorney experience 0.218∗ 0.095 0.172∗∗ 0.088
Local homeownership rate (%) -0.020∗ 0.011 -0.016 0.010
Local labor force participation rate (%) -0.013 0.015 -0.008 0.013
Income/local median household income 0.004 0.108 0.016 0.092
Local households living below poverty line (%) -0.043∗∗ 0.022 -0.035∗∗ 0.019
Estimated house value/median home value -0.356∗ 0.084 -0.304∗ 0.072
Local median housing cost/median home value -18.082 89.051 -21.895 76.205
Local average household size 22.058∗ 17.845 23.427∗ 18.592
Mills ratio —0.354∗ 0.120
Observations: 555; Observations: 145;
χ-squared: 115.64. Adj. R-squared: 0.218.
Notes: 1.* indicates signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level.
2. ** indicates signiﬁcance at the 10 percent level.
27Table 7. Estimation Result: Foreclosure Sale Price
(sale price/mortgage balance due at the time of bankruptcy, inf. adj.)
Variable With Adj Without Adj
Estimate S.D. Estimate S.D.
Months of mortgage delinquency 0.003 0.003 -0.001 0.002
Subprime mortgage lender -0.035 0.074 -0.038 0.075
Local lender 0.131 0.101 0.173∗∗ 0.101
Lender being loan servicer -0.042 0.116 -0.079 0.116
Tax lien foreclosure 0.073 0.122 0.008 0.115
Filer attorney experience -0.063 0.071 0.017 0.063
Lender attorney experience 0.164∗ 0.073 0.173∗ 0.101
Local homeownership rate (%) -0.005 0.008 -0.008 0.008
Local labor force participation rate (%) -0.006 0.010 -0.004 0.010
Income/local median household income -0.090 0.082 -0.027 0.077
Local households living below poverty line (%) -0.026∗∗ 0.015 -0.025∗∗ 0.015
Estimated house value/median home value -0.151∗ 0.057 -0.143∗ 0.057
Local median housing cost/median home value 79.853 65.039 16.553 60.833
Local average household size 0.715∗ 0.0.361 0.673∗ 0.366
Mills ratio 0.223∗ 0.090
Observations: 555; Observations: 145;
χ-squared: 98.50. Adj. R-squared: 0.169.
Notes: 1.* indicates signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level.
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Figure 2. The Homeownership Experience of Bankruptcy Filers
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